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Cost of capital in an international context: 
Institutional distance, quality, and dynamics 
 
Abstract: Cost of debt is a key cognitive anchor for managerial decisions and an important determinant 
of firm profitability. We extend international management research by analyzing the effects of 
institutional distance, institutional quality, and their dynamics on the cost of debt in the context of 
foreign direct investments (FDI). We test our conceptual model on a sample of companies making 
3,764 greenfield foreign direct investments from developed into less developed markets. Using 
hierarchical linear modelling, we show that the financial consequences of internationalizing into 
countries with weak institutions depend on both the institutional distance between countries, as well as 
their institutional quality. Furthermore, we find that recent changes in institutional quality form 





When firms internationalize, a key question for management is the effect of the investment on the 
firms’ cost of capital and specifically the cost of debt (Gallo, 2015). Cost of debt determines the 
availability of capital for future investments and the profitability of current operations. As investment 
decisions are based on the expected returns, corrected for the cost of raising capital (Fama and French, 
2004), cost of debt is a crucial determinant in strategy formation (Sharpe, 1964). The literatures on 
underinvestment (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) attest 
to the pivotal importance of the cost of debt in international investment decisions (Mansi and Reeb, 
2002; Reeb et al., 2001). In the field of finance, cost of debt is frequently explained using trade-off 
theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). From this theoretical perspective, the core determinants of cost 
of debt are tax benefits of debt on the one hand and “bankruptcy penalties” on the other (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973 p.912). Tax benefits rather play a role in firms’ reaction to the cost of debt 
(Goldstein et al., 2001). They are mostly associated with a company’s domestic tax rate. Foreign tax 
rates certainly influence the location choice of an investment, but to a lesser extent the ex-post change 
in cost of debt. Hence, specifically an increasing probability of bankruptcy and the associated cost of 
financial distress are major drivers of the cost of borrowing for a company.  
Finance literature identifies numerous determinants of cost of debt on the firm- as well as on the 
industry-level based on this model (Fama and French, 2002). Research on the country or cross-country 
level, however, remains scarce and theoretically under-developed. Empirically, the few existing studies 
focus either solely on a company’s home or host country context (Chen et al., 2011; Hail and Leuz, 
2009; Koedijk and Van Dijk, 2004; Qi et al., 2010), or solely on the differences between the two (Gray 
et al., 2013; Zhu and Cai, 2014). Theoretically, while making an important contribution to the literature, 
arguments do not relate to an overarching theoretical concept of the environment, but rather focus on 
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selective influences and remain largely fragmented in their overall contribution. We believe that 
complementing trade-off theory with the institutional perspective from the field of international 
business provides a promising alley to develop a more consistent conceptual framework of country-
level influences on the cost of debt. 
The institutional perspective in international business (Berry et al., 2010; North, 2004; Peng et al., 
2009; Scott, 1995) is guided by the assumption that not only firm or industry characteristics, but to 
equal extent, the institutional context matters for international investment and the risks associated with 
it. Literature conceptualizes this institutional context along three dimensions: Institutional quality, 
institutional distance, and institutional dynamics. Institutional quality, i.e. the quality of formal and 
informal institutions within a country, has been a major research area in the field of IB and strategy for 
a long time (e.g. Filatotchev et al., 2013; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Scholars have shown that host (Bell 
et al., 2014; Henisz, 2000; Meyer et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2012) and home country institutional 
quality (Kogut et al., 2002; Vasudeva et al., 2013) significantly influence risk associated with firms’ 
international activities. To a lesser degree, researchers theorized on the relevance of distance between 
the home and host countries’ institutional contexts (e.g. Zaheer, 1995). Just recently, scholars have 
started to transfer this approach to the field of international finance and capital markets research (Bell 
et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2010). Lastly, the dynamics of institutional contexts have received least 
attention (Peng et al., 2008). This is surprising since investment decisions are driven by expectations 
about future risk and hence not (solely) by the current institutional setting, but also by the dynamics 
(development) of the institutional environment over time. Decision makers within and outside the firm 
base their assessment of risk associated with an international investment also on the trend of 
institutional development over time (improvement or deterioration) and the expectations they form 
because of observed changes (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Research provides substantial empirical evidence of the impact of different dimensions of institutional 
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context on risk associated with strategic decisions, such as foreign market entry mode, ownership 
choice, or other strategic foreign investment decisions (Brouthers, 2002; Capron and Guillén, 2009; 
Delios and Henisz, 2000; Hernández and Nieto, 2015; Hwang, 1989; Rueda-Sabater, 2000; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002). Given the conceptual relevance and the empirical evidence as a relevant determinant 
of risk, we integrate the institutional logic along the three lines with the trade-off perspective. 
Specifically, we reason that institutional contexts, i.e. their quality, distance, and dynamics, will also 
matter for the risk of bankruptcy in the trade-off perspective on international investments. Firms 
investing in foreign markets are always facing all three dimensions of institutional context as well as 
their interdependencies. Omitting one of the dimensions in the assessment of the institutional context 
may lead to biased conclusions. Consequently, the objectives of this paper are to develop a framework 
of institutional influences and their relevant interdependencies on the cost of debt associated with an 
international investment, and to test this framework empirically. 
Our study makes the following important interdisciplinary contributions to theory in the fields of 
finance and international business (Cheng et al., 2009). First, by integrating trade-off theory from the 
field of finance with the institutional perspective from the field of IB, we extend the institutional 
perspective from the field of IB to the field of finance, and provide evidence that predictions based on 
this perspective also hold in the cost of capital logic. While classically rooted in factor markets, we 
thus expand the applicability of this perspective to a relatively new field, where applications of the 
institutional perspective so far are limited. Second, by combining both perspectives, we also contribute 
to trade-off theory from the field of finance. We do so by expanding the set of determinants of the 
bankruptcy risk, and by offering a conceptualization of institutional context based on the institutional 
perspective. As financial markets are often argued to be ‘efficient’ across borders, we believe this is an 
important addition and helps to build a more comprehensive framework that integrates institutional 
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barriers and frictions. This is specifically relevant as we are among the first to provide a theory-based 
framework of institutional country-level indicators that matter for FDI financing. 
We conduct our study in an environment in which companies from developed countries make 
greenfield investments in less developed countries, in order to get a clear and undistorted picture of the 
role of country risk in the cost of capital. This allows us to explicitly analyze the effect of an investment 
without firm-level confounding effects found in mergers and acquisitions. We use hierarchical linear 
modelling to account for firm level and country-level effects while controlling for the impact of 
industries, time, and firm-level variables following Fama and French (2002). 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Corporate strategy, finance and IB literature acknowledge close links between strategic decisions and 
financial constraints faced by the firm (Filatotchev and Piesse, 2009; Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2008; 
Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). Similarly, finance literature provides theories that link financial resources 
with strategic decisions, investment behavior, and growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Beck et 
al., 2005). Yet, very little research has addressed the financial consequences of strategic decisions and 
even less the role of investment context therein. 
The most prominent theories from the field of finance explaining the cost of capital are pecking order 
theory (Myers, 1977, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and trade-off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973). We base our theoretical reasoning on trade-off theory because it explicitly includes investment 
risk and the cost of financial distress. Pricing of equity is determined by investors’ expected return on 
investment relative to the risk associated with it. Since creditors do not participate in the upside of an 
investment, their assessment is predominantly focused on risk. Risk is also the core element in our 
framework linking trade-off theory and institutional context. Hence, to have a clearer identification of 
risk effects we focus on cost of debt rather than equity. The main drivers of debt ratios in trade-off 
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theory are tax benefits of debt on the one hand and “bankruptcy penalties” on the other hand (Kraus 
and Litzenberger, 1973 p.912). The tax benefit is largely related to marginal tax rates at the global 
headquarter, not the financing of individual investment projects (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). Also, 
the tax benefit mainly affects the way firms adapt the financial structure given the cost of debt 
(Goldstein et al., 2001). Therefore, we focus on the expected bankruptcy cost. If the probability of 
bankruptcy and the associated cost of financial distress increase, so will the cost of borrowing for a 
company. This cost is strongly related to the risk of investments, as the sum and structure of these risks 
drive the probability of bankruptcy. 
Trade-off theory does not explicitly address issues of international context or internationalization. 
However, scholars argue, “[…] there may be factors unique to multinational firms […] and the 
traditional capital structure models for domestic corporations may be inadequate” (Burgman, 1996 
p.563). In line with this reasoning, the institutional perspective provides three clear links between cost 
of debt and the institutional context of an international investment. First, diversification logic predicts 
that internationalizing multinationals (MNCs) can reduce their cost of debt by diversification of 
investments in institutionally distant country markets (Fatemi, 1984). This is because diversification 
reduces firm-specific risk (Shapiro, 1978; Stulz, 1999) and in consequence the expected probability of 
bankruptcy following trade-off theory logic. On the contrary and second, from a trade-off theory 
perspective additional risk resulting from the presence in markets with imperfect institutional settings 
(i.e. institutionally founded risk) increases the probability of bankruptcy and the cost of debt. 
Consequently, the change in cost of debt is contingent upon the institutional context of the home and 
host market, as well as the distance between them. Third, since cost of debt is directly linked to 
expected or future probability of bankruptcy, it is also evident that investors consider not only the static 
institutional parameters in their assessment of cost of debt, but also their future expectations on 
institutional development.  
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Overall, the institutional perspective proposes three simultaneous but potentially conflicting effects of 
the institutional environment on cost of debt changes in the context of international investments. We 
simultaneously assess the three contextual dimensions within our model: the distance between the two 
institutional settings, the country specific quality of institutions, and finally, the inter-temporal 
dimension of how the distance and institutions in the two countries are expected to change. 
Trade-off theory assumes that the cost of debt is a function of firm risk and expected probability of 
bankruptcy. A firm’s risk of default is reduced by diversifying into imperfectly correlated markets 
(Bodnar et al., 1999; Burgman, 1996; French and Poterba, 1991; Geringer et al., 1989; Kwok and Reeb, 
2000; Reeb et al., 1998; Reeb et al., 2001; Rugman, 1976). In an international context, we expect the 
effect of diversification to increase with institutional distance between the home and host country: 
Institutional differences imply different states of economic development, which in turn are associated 
with uncorrelated cash flows (Lewellen, 1971; Longin and Solnik, 1995). Thus, by investing in 
institutionally distant markets, firms can reduce their overall risk of bankruptcy. In consequence, with 
increasing diversification in institutionally distant markets, firms can raise debt more cheaply. Of 
course, one particular investment is not the only contributor to firms’ cost of debt. Therefore, we refer 
in all our hypotheses to marginal cost of debt. That is, the change in cost of debt following an 
international investment. Regarding an investment in such an institutionally distant market and its 
effect on the cost of debt, we develop H1: 
Hypothesis 1: Investments into institutionally distant countries diversify risk and decrease the 
marginal cost of debt. 
However, while distance provides opportunities for diversification, the institutional quality in the home 
and host countries affect context-specific risk (Hayakawa et al., 2013), which also influences the 
marginal cost of debt triggered by an investment. If the a-priori institutional quality of the home country 
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is high, investments in lower quality countries make a strong difference to the overall risk-exposure of 
the firm and therefore ultimately to marginal cost of debt. When a-priori home country institutional 
quality is comparatively low (for a developed market), the a-priori base risk of bankruptcy for the focal 
company is comparatively high. When investing from such a comparatively high-risk environment into 
a less developed country, the marginal risk from an investment will be comparatively low, as will be 
the marginal cost of debt. This reasoning is supported by a number of studies that relate cost of capital 
to home country institutions (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Brounen et al., 2006; De Jong et al., 2008; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2004; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998).We therefore derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Investments from institutionally weaker home countries add limited risk 
and lead to lower marginal cost of debt.  
While the home country context determines the initial base risk of international operations and the 
company’s ex-ante probability of default, host country institutional quality influences the ex-post 
addition of marginal risk and hence the marginal cost of debt. Consequently, host country institutional 
context needs to be included in the modelling of marginal cost of debt.  
Some studies account for host country characteristics in financial decisions and cost of capital. For 
example, Giannetti (2003) finds that host country institutional aspects such as creditor protection, stock 
market development and legal enforcement heavily influence companies’ financing choices. Qi et al. 
(2010) show that political rights in the host country negatively affect the cost of corporate bonds and 
Armstrong et al. (2000) show that the development of bankruptcy laws in the markets of MNCs affects 
the pricing of both equity and debt. Relying on trade-off theory, we reason that investments in low 
quality institutional environments increase overall corporate risk, the probability of bankruptcy and 
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ultimately the cost of debt. Straightforwardly, the lower the institutional quality of the host country 
context in question, the higher will be the marginal cost of debt. 
Hypothesis 2b: Investments into institutionally weak host countries add relatively more 
risk and increase the marginal cost of debt.  
In trade-off theory, cost of debt is determined by the creditors’ assessment of probability of default of 
a company in the future. Both the institutional distance and the institutional quality of countries are not 
static (Berry et al., 2010). Effects of these dynamics have been observed before. Inoue et al. (2013), 
for example, show decreasing returns on preferential access to government equity as institutions in a 
country develops. Investor’s assessment of the probability of default is also forward-looking. Future 
expectations of creditors regarding the institutional environments and distance affect their assessment 
of risk and the marginal cost of debt sustained by an internationalizing company. This forward-looking 
perspective of cost of capital determination makes it necessary to include future expectations about the 
institutional environment. Our literature review revealed only two studies that link firms’ financial 
decisions to environmental or institutional dynamics. However, both of them strongly support our 
claim that inter-temporal changes will have an effect on cost of debt in international context: Simerly 
and Li (2000) find that environmental dynamics on an industry level affects firms’ capital structure. 
Hail and Leuz (2009) show that future growth prospects affect cost of capital in cross-listings.  
When managers and creditors evaluate risks associated with investment projects, expectations of future 
risk are crucial. Therefore, we argue that the cost at which creditors are prepared to finance an 
international investment depends not only on the distance and on institutional quality at the time of 
investment, but also on the expectations of how they will evolve in the future. Hence, we include 
proxies for institutional dynamics and creditors’ expectations for the individual countries involved and 
the distance between them. 
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In the absence of reliable estimates for future institutional distance and quality, investors tend to use 
past changes as cognitive anchors to predict future changes (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). This natural behavior to use past trends for forecasts under uncertainty, even if 
they have very little predictive capacity, has also been labelled topically oriented trend adjustment in 
the forecasting literature (Bofinger and Schmidt, 2003; Meub et al., 2015). Consequently, creditors 
face uncertainty of future developments with regards to future institutional distance. Investors form 
their expectations based on trends they observe in data and they adjust their estimation of bankruptcy 
risk accordingly. Investors’ assessment of the diversification effect into institutionally distant markets 
inevitably alters if the institutional gap is likely to change in the near future. Therefore, we argue that 
negative changes in institutional distance (reflecting an expected reduction of institutional distance and 
an erosion of the diversification effect) lead to an increase in the marginal cost of debt, and vice versa. 
Hypothesis 3: Investments between institutionally converging countries reduce 
diversification potential and increase marginal cost of debt. 
Home and host country institutional quality also have dynamic properties. Following the argumentation 
leading to H2a and H2b, we argue that a decrease in home country institutional quality decreases the 
risk added by internationalizing to an institutionally weaker host country. That is because 
internationalizing into an institutionally weaker country makes less of a difference to the overall 
probability of bankruptcy. In other words, expected institutional quality reductions at home lead to 
higher expected base risk, a lower marginal risk increase and a reduction in marginal cost of debt. 
Applying the same logic, it can be anticipated that an expected deterioration in institutional quality in 
the host country increases the anticipated probability of bankruptcy and the marginal cost of debt.  
Hypothesis 4a: Investments from institutionally weakening home countries add less risk 
and decrease marginal cost of debt.  
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Hypothesis 4b: Investments into institutionally weakening host countries add more risk 
and increase marginal cost of debt.  
One of our core propositions is that only an integrative assessment of all three dimensions of 
institutional context including relevant interactions will help to provide a consistent and robust picture 
of marginal cost of debt in the context of international investments. As theory proposes that 
diversification and marginal risks of a specific market entry have opposing effects, but both always 
occur simultaneously, one needs to consider the interaction of the two. We proposed that 
internationalization provides a diversification advantage. However, if institutional quality in a host 
country is very low, the diversifying effect of distance is counterbalanced by the additional risk of 
bankruptcy resulting from an investment in a weak institutional environment. In a holistic assessment 
of institutional context, the value stemming from diversification into an institutionally distant country 
is outweighed by low institutional quality in the host country. This is supported by evidence in the 
literature, as De Jong et al. (2008), for example, show that country specific effects have both a direct 
and indirect or interacting effect on firm’s capital structure decisions. Therefore, we formulate a 
moderating effect between institutional distance and host country institutional quality: 
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of institutional distance on marginal cost of debt is moderated 
by host country institutional quality: The diversification effect of institutional distance is reduced 
in host countries with low institutional quality. 
Addressing the inter-temporal dimension, managers and investors may anticipate future deterioration 
in host country institutional quality and increase the cost of debt for the internationalizing company 
accordingly. In line with our reasoning leading to hypothesis 5, we propose a moderating effect 
between institutional distance and the dynamics of host country institutional quality: 
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Hypothesis 6: The negative effect of institutional distance on marginal cost of debt is moderated 
by host country institutional changes: The diversification effect of institutional distance is 
reduced in host countries with deteriorating institutional quality. 
In sum, these hypotheses represent our conceptual model of the institutional contextualizations of 
marginal cost of debt in the context of international investments. All of them are founded in the overlap 
between the institutional perspective in IB and trade-off theory. Figure 1 provides an overview of our 
conceptual model.  
3. Sample and Methods 
We choose to limit our analysis to firms from developed markets internationalizing into less developed 
economies, since the cost of debt determination has been shown to be different for companies from 
markets at different levels of development (Booth et al., 2001). Our definition of developed markets is 
based on the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI). The index is the most widely used 
equity benchmark index for emerging markets (Asness et al., 2013). We chose the term “less 
developed” for all other countries intentionally to highlight the down-stream nature of all investment 
and we exclude all investment in which despite MSCI classification, we do not see a clear treatment of 
a risk increase (i.e. investment is made into a target country of higher risk than the source country). We 
focus on a downstream sample for theoretical and empirical reasons to achieve the clearest 
identification of cost of debt effects as possible. Theoretically, systematic differences in the market’s 
pricing of debt for firms from less-developed markets (increased a-priori liability of foreignness, 
potential positive signaling effects), differences in financing patterns between companies from 
developed and less-developed countries, and generally differing investment behavior would require 
consideration of further cost-of debt effects in a bidirectional sample (Gozzi et al., 2010). Such 
systematic differences would most likely affect the dependencies in our model, would introduce noise 
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into our sample and would imply a transferability of results, which we believe, is unwarranted due to 
the idiosyncrasies of companies internationalizing from less-developed countries. Empirically, 
modelling the trade-off in a clear and directed manner requires us to have a clear observation of 
increasing risk (or diversification). Also, there is more variation in host country settings among less 
developed countries. Finally, focusing on investments in countries with weaker institutional quality 
allows us to trace the effects of host country institutional quality on cost of debt and we can make sure 
that the investment projects in question always have countries as hosts that have lower institutional 
quality than the home countries.  
We believe that FDI will have a more pronounced effect on a company’s cost of debt than non-equity 
modes. We obtain a sample of 3,764 greenfield investments between 2005 and 2012 using the fDi 
Markets database maintained by the Financial Times. This sample represents approximately 20% of 
the population of foreign direct investments flowing into less developed countries as covered by fDi 
Markets. The database is the most comprehensive source of cross border greenfield investments 
covering all countries and sectors. It is used by international institutions such as UNCTAD to compile 
greenfield FDI data (UNCTAD, 2014 p.8). The sample size is essentially determined by the availability 
of institutional data in less developed countries receiving FDI. In addition, the investing firms need to 
disclose financial information to be relevant for our analyses. To avoid bias, we make sure to have 
investment projects of various sizes (see Table 1) and investments in a broad selection of country pairs 
(see below for details). We test our hypotheses on a sample of greenfield investments. Excluding 
M&As we eliminate biases introduced from the target and transaction characteristics (i.e. friendly vs. 
hostile, related vs. unrelated, upstream vs. downstream in the value chain). It allows us to observe cost 
of debt changes within the same (or very similar) company context rather than comparing a pre-merger 
company to a potentially very different post-merger one. In addition, we believe that the functioning 
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of M&A markets is inherently different from firms’ usual area of operation and includes a multitude 
of other financial, strategic and tax issues, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Overall, the data include investments from 21 developed countries into 27 less developed countries, 
which is a broad and quite symmetric distribution. As expected, the most prominent pairs of countries 
in terms of number of transactions are investments from the USA to China (18%), Japan to China 
(15%), Germany to China (6%), and the USA to Brazil (5%). The majority of investments (56%) are 
dispersed over 165 pairs of countries, each contributing less than 5% to the total. Those include 
investments from Switzerland into Croatia, from Australia into Colombia, and from the United States 
into Botswana, for example. The sample covers all continents. Regarding industries, the sample consist 
of firms from 39 different industries. Chemicals take the largest share in the sample (9%), industrial 
machinery, equipment & tools follows with 8 per cent. The third largest contributor is food and tobacco 
with 7 per cent. We believe that the sample is well diversified with regards to countries and industries 
captured. 
We conduct hierarchical linear analysis to account for differences in error terms between the firm and 
country levels. Hierarchical linear modelling is superior to ordinary least square modelling because it 
explicitly incorporates different levels of error clusters. Hierarchical effects estimation allows efficient 
modelling and avoids both spuriously significant and inefficient estimators resulting from clustered 
error terms (Hox, 2002). We test the superiority of random over fixed effects before introducing cross-
level interactions into the model. We also control for year and industry effects using dummies. 
4. Variables and Measurement 
Dependent variable 
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Our main dependent variable is the cost of debt in the year following the greenfield FDI obtained from 
Bloomberg. We also run models with the change in cost of debt in the year and the two years following 
the greenfield investment as robustness checks, which yield consistent results. We use yearly rather 
than monthly changes in cost of debt to account for the fact that capital structure is rather sticky and 
changes involve adjustment costs (Byoun, 2008; Fama and French, 2002; Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973; Shyam-Sunder and C. Myers, 1999). The mean cost of debt for our sample companies is 2.572 
per cent annually.  
Main variables of interest 
To test our hypotheses, we include six independent variables. We measure institutional distance (H1) 
using a compound measure of the normative and regulatory (Scott, 1995) dimensions of cross-national 
institutional distance as proposed by Berry et al. (2010). These dimensions have been found to 
specifically affect the cost of debt (Atilgan et al., 2015). We use the administrative, economic, financial, 
and political distance scores computed from time-varying covariance matrices to capture the dynamics 
of the measure. These data have been updated in 2014. We compound the four dimensions following 
Kogut and Singh (1988) by weighting the distance dimensions with the inverse of their variance. Such 
a compound is the most-used indicator of distance in IB literature (Bae and Salomon, 2010). We 
conduct robustness checks and find very similar results for individual dimensions of institutional 
distance compared to the compound we apply. 
We measure institutional quality by absolute country risk measures for home and host countries (H2a 
and H2b). Country risk is a multidimensional construct as risk can stem from varying institutional 
sources (Miller, 1992). As a consequence, we believe that an isolated consideration of certain types of 
risk does not capture the full complexity of a country’s institutional quality. Therefore, we follow 
Bevan et al. (2004) and use the country risk score compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
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and provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing to operationalize the institutional quality in the 
home and host country. Of course, higher country risk represents lower institutional quality. Hence, 
the signs of our coefficients have to be inverted for interpretation. To account for the time lag between 
investment decision and market entry, we use institutional quality from the year before investment. We 
calculate the year-on-year changes in institutional distance (H3), as well as in the levels of institutional 
quality for both home and host country (H4a and H4b) to capture changes in expectations. We do so 
using changes from three to two years before investment to avoid multicollinearity issues associated 
with incorporating the value for the year before investment. 
As expected, when firms from developed countries invest in less developed markets, host country 
institutional quality is on average lower than home country institutional quality. Overall, there is 
considerable variation in both home and host country institutional quality and each market entry in our 
sample is a downstream investment into a country with weaker than home country institutions. 
Company-level controls 
We control for size of the foreign direct investment using the reported local FDI capital expenditure in 
the FDI markets database. Cost of debt in the year preceding the investment is included to make the 
change in cost of debt following the investment visible. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) we use long-term debt to total assets as a measure of leverage. In addition, we include the ratio 
of equity over total assets to account for capital structure characteristics not included in the debt-ratio 
measure. Fama and French (2002) have shown that the beta of a company influences a company’s cost 
of debt and capital structure. We use the five-year asset beta as reported in the Orbis database of Bureau 
van Dijk as a direct measure of company specific risk. We also control for other firm-level effects 
following Fama and French (2002). 
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As the cost of debt is highly dependent on agency cost, firm governance and shareholder structure play 
an important role in determining a company’s cost of debt. We control for governance structure by 
including the number of recorded shareholders. Research on internal capital markets has shown that 
managers can use the complexity of organizational structure in highly diversified firms for empire 
building and inefficient decision making (Cline et al., 2014). We capture this agency effect by including 
the number of companies in group, number of subsidiaries and number of affiliates in group as 
measures of organizational complexity.  
Host country-level controls 
Several macro variables have shown to have an effect on capital structure and cost of debt (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). We include country level controls for GDP growth, total GDP, inflation 
(Consumer price index), lending rate, one-year exchange rate volatility and inward FDI. To distinguish 
different types of emerging markets, we include dummies based on (Hoskisson et al., 2013). In their 
five-group classification of mid-range economies, they differentiate emerging markets based on 
improvements in their institutional environment and their factor markets. 
5. Results & Discussion 
Descriptive statistics and partial correlations of the variables in our models are shown in Tables 1-3. 
We find no problematic or surprising cross-correlations. The two profitability measures are of course 
highly correlated. Leaving out either one, however, does not significantly change our results. Following 
Fama and French (2002) we keep both in our firm-level model. 
----------------------------------- 
insert Tables 1-3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
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We run an empty model (1) in Table 4 including the fixed effects specification for industries, years, 
and host countries for the 3,764 observations we collected. The intercept is significant and gives us a 
conditional mean cost of debt of 2.283 per cent in the year after the FDI for the reference industry and 
year. 
----------------------------------- 
insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
We then introduce company level determinants of cost of debt in model (2) and closely follow Fama 
and French (2002) therein. The intercept remains significant and positive at a somewhat lower level. 
We control for past cost of debt using the cost of debt in the previous year. Consequently, the other 
variables can be interpreted as net of the cost of capital in the year minus one (i.e. change in cost of 
debt). We do not report insignificant controls. Firm-level coefficients support findings by earlier 
research (Fama and French, 2002). In model 3 we introduce the variables measuring institutional 
distance and quality. We test them together because our conceptual model is based on the assumption 
of parallel effects and because, from a statistical perspective, their interplay is contingent on the 
observed values for the respective other variables (we also find the effects in individual tests, though).  
We find strong support for H1 which states that investments in foreign markets should provide a 
diversification advantage that increases with increasing institutional distance. This expands existing 
findings from Griffin and Karolyi (1998). On the one hand, our results support their argument that 
international diversification can reduce the cost of debt. On the other hand, our approach moves beyond 
their assessment of international diversification, which is purely based on the host country level. By 
focusing on the cross-country level and by providing a clear concept and measure of distance, our 
approach provides both an important addition to existing theory as well as guidance for practitioners. 
We also find strong support for H2a, stating that lower home country institutional quality means less 
risk added by the investment and hence lower marginal cost of debt. This broadly reflects existing 
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results from Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). Qi et al. (2010) and Zhu and Cai (2014) highlight 
the relevance of the home country institutional context for cost of debt changes stemming from 
international investments. In the interpretation of host country institutional quality and distance, it is 
important to look at the value of the respective other in order to interpret the overall effect. Results do 
not provide direct support for our H2b, as we find that lower host country institutional quality reduces 
risk as reflected in lower cost of debt. This is not in line with most existing research that points towards 
a risk and cost increase from low institutional quality in the host country. However, our holistic 
conceptualization of the institutional context allows us to derive implications beyond effects of the 
single dimensions: as argued in the development of H5, effects of distance and institutional quality in 
the host country on marginal cost of debt are related conceptually and empirically. Which effect 
prevails absolutely may be context specific.  
For ease of interpretation of the results on H5, we provide effect plots for the dependencies of cost of 
debt on host country institutional quality and distance given the respective other in Figure 2. While for 
low distances the cost of debt decreases with decreasing institutional quality in the host country (bottom 
left panel of Figure 2), it increases for higher distances (bottom right panel of Figure 2). In the latter 
case, we therefore find support for H2b even though the direct effect overall does not match our 
conceptual model. Consequently, our findings strongly suggest that effects of institutional context and 
distance must be modelled jointly because of strong conceptual and empirical contingencies: In our 
case, the diversification effect of distance dominates the risk-increasing effect of low institutional 
quality for high values of institutional quality in the host country (see top panels in Figure 2). For 
investments in countries with low institutional quality, firms are not able to reap the benefits of 
diversification and the risk-increasing effect of low institutional quality dominates. This supports H5 
also in terms of the direction of the interaction effect. 
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In model 4 we add the temporal dynamics to our model. We move from a fixed-effects specification to 
a random-effects specification. The change in model fit is not significant. The findings from model 3 
remain robust. We do not find support for H3. This tells us that simultaneous variation in both distance 
and time might be more complex than the predictions made by static trade-off theory.  
Interestingly, we find a significant negative effect of changes in the home country institutional quality 
while our hypothesis predicts a positive effect (mind the inverse measure). The direct effect of a change 
in institutional quality in the home country most likely dominates the effect of the international 
investment. The added risk resulting from low institutional quality in the host country may well be 
reduced with expectations of a decrease in home country institutional quality. Yet, the change in the 
home country directly affects the cost of debt as well and the latter effect seems to dominate. We find 
support for the direct effect we hypothesize in H4b. Yet, as highlighted above, we need to be cautious 
in interpretation of the direct effects because of the relevance of interactions.  
This supports the relevance of our final hypothesis, H6. Again, to facilitate interpretation, we provide 
effect plots in Figure 3. We observe that the overall effects of expectations about changes to 
institutional quality and distance are numerically weaker than those of the status quo. Yet, they are 
highly significant. Expectations seem to play a highly relevant role, but (in economic terms) a smaller 
one than the status quo. We could interpret this finding in terms of how expectations are formed: 
mostly, they seem to be based on institutional quality and distance as they are observed today; expected 
changes strengthen or weaken these expectations. Contrary to the status quo, the diversification effect 
prevails in institutionally weak countries, while for institutionally well developed countries the effect 
of institutional quality dominates.  
Control variables do not change much in magnitude and significance throughout our models (see Table 
4). We conduct robustness checks with an alternative dependent variable as well as different 
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independent variables. In the dependent variable, we use the change of the cost of debt and obtain very 
similar results. In the independent variables, we measure institutional distance in several ways 
(economic distance, political distance, compound measure in the main analyses). We find very similar 
results. We therefore are confident that our findings are robust.  
6. Implications and Limitations 
Our empirical examination largely supports the conceptual model we developed based on an integration 
of trade-off theory with the institutional perspective from the field of IB. We find strong and robust 
evidence that marginal cost of debt is contingent on the institutional contexts, as represented by 
institutional quality, distance, and dynamics.  
Apart from the empirical contributions we make with the comprehensive dataset of greenfield 
investments in less developed markets and the method we apply, our results provide important 
contributions to theory development. By answering the calls of Agmon (2006) and Bowe et al. (2010), 
we integrate theory from the field of finance with theory and conceptual work central to the field of 
IB. This has important implications for theory in the field of finance. In this area, theoretical reasoning 
is largely based on a ‘context-free assumption’, especially with regard to the country- and cross-country 
context. Our results provide strong evidence that this assumption needs to be reconsidered. Our 
conceptual model provides a clear and theory-based framework on potential effects stemming from the 
institutional environment and our results point strongly towards the significance of country-level 
institutional factors for cost of capital in an international context. We therefore believe that theory 
development in the field of finance can benefit from integrating and/or adjusting our conceptual 
approach to further aspects of investment and financing across borders.  
We also make an important contribution to institution-based reasoning in the field of IB. While such 
reasoning so far largely focusses on factor markets, our model and results provide evidence that this 
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reasoning also transfers to the field of financial markets. Our results thus provide further evidence for 
the relevance of institutional reasoning also beyond the areas the approach has already been applied to. 
We believe that beyond the two core aspects elaborated above, our approach provides relevant 
contributions for two additional streams of international business research: the multinationality-
performance discussion and transaction cost theory. First, firm performance is a function of expected 
cash flows and the uncertainty associated with them. Conceptualizing the two elements separately may 
help to overcome conflicting findings of past research. On the one hand, internationalization confronts 
firms with additional risks. On the other hand, it provides firms with opportunities to diversify their 
returns. Hence, only when taking into account both, research can find out which effect dominates under 
what circumstances. Second, when analyzing entry mode decisions, researchers have repeatedly 
stressed that a country’s institutions and cultural distance are insufficient measures of uncertainty (Zhao 
et al., 2004). We add institutional dynamics as an additional driver of risk and provide empirical 
evidence on its relevance. Adding the first order expectations about future changes in uncertainty, as 
we propose in this paper, may thus help to get a better grasp of different aspects of uncertainty in entry 
mode studies based on transaction cost theory. Our results highlight the role of institutional 
expectations and their effect on MNEs. So far, negative effects from institutional dynamics on MNC 
have been found in the political context (Fisman, 2001; Inoue et al., 2013; Siegel, 2007) when cash-
flows of a politically embedded MNE are misappropriated by a changing opposition government. Our 
result shows that negative effects can occur indirectly from non-local stakeholders such as investors, 
which adjust their claims to the perceived increase in bankruptcy risk. 
Despite the extensive dataset and clear theoretical perspective, our study has several limitations. First, 
while we can account for changes in cost of capital and institutional quality, as well as the size of the 
greenfield investment, we cannot control for changes in several other company-level variables such as 
international diversification or number of recorded shareholders during the time when the greenfield 
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investment occurs. This could be a limitation as changes in cost of debt may be attributable to variations 
in these company-level determinants, rather than host country effects. Given the large dataset, however, 
we hope that the effects of these changes – as they are, by definition, largely unrelated to the greenfield 
investment in question – average out to zero. Second, as in much literature relating to institutional 
distance, we have to make a choice of how to measure this construct. We use the dimensions of Berry 
et al. (2010) that relate to the regulatory and normative domain as identified by Scott (1995). This 
choice is based upon evidence from Atilgan et al. (2015) who demonstrate that these dimensions are 
relevant for the valuation of debt. This choice, despite the results being robust to changing the 
dimensions and prior evidence supporting it, leaves room for further research. The choice of 
dimensions and their respective weighting remains a topic of intense academic discussion (Dow and 
Karunaratna, 2006). Third, while using greenfield investments as a research setting provides empirical 
benefits, it reduces the generalizability of our results since M&A transaction may function very 
differently. In fact, we believe that they do and we leave it up to future research to address this question. 
Fourth, a similar limitation is related to the directional or down-stream nature of the investments in our 
sample. Looking at upstream investments will require different theoretical perspectives that account 
for the different nature of such investments but could provide valuable insights and important 
contributions to IB literature. Fifth, future researchers should also consider the source of debt. In our 
model we do not distinguish whether the debt used to finance the greenfield investment is domestic or 
foreign. Controlling for the institutional environments in both countries, we implicitly assume that 
international debt composition of the company remains on average stable before and after the event. 
While this is a reasonable assumption considering strong home country bias in lending (Carey and 
Nini, 2007; Centeno and Mello, 1999; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1995; Fidora et al., 2007; Giannetti and 
Laeven, 2012; Presbitero et al., 2014), foreign debt can help to mitigate exchange rate risk, political 
risk, and open up favorable financing opportunities. Accordingly, the issue of debt sourcing is one that 
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needs addressing in future IB research. Finally, reverse causality may be an issue. It is possible that 
firms anticipate lower cost of debt and decide to enter volatile markets when the price for debt in the 
future is low. In this respect, we have to make the assumption that managers do not exclusively make 
decisions based on the availability of financial resources. 
Beyond the potential research questions highlighted above, our results indicate further promising 
avenues for research in different areas. Future studies analyzing the cost of debt or other consequences 
of risk associated with international investment should go deeper into the institutional characteristics 
of host countries, combining institutional aspects with corporate governance indicators such as the 
measures developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and Berkowitz et al. (2003). Such research may help 
understand two important issues. From the country perspective, legislators can build institutional 
environments such that they attract firms with desirable governance characteristics. From the firm 
perspective, investment decisions can be based on the match between the firm’s and target countries’ 
governance structures. Disaggregations of institutional quality into different dimensions could be used 
in order to identify the macro drivers of cost of debt change. While there are some dimensions of 
institutional distance that may lead to both diversification and risk-increasing effects, there may be 
others where this is not the case. For some, only risk-increasing effects may be observable, while for 
others only the diversifying effect plays a role. Finally, trading off diversification and risk-increasing 





Figure 1: Illustration of hypothesized relationships. Dotted lines indicate control variables. 
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
(1) Cost of debt (t+1) 3,764 2.572 1.608 0.000 9.002 
(2) FDI capital expenditure 3,764 105.236 314.129 0.045 7,177.000 
(3) Cost of debt (t-1) 3,764 2.793 1.654 0.000 9.002 
(4) Long term debt ratio 3,764 27.161 20.967 0.000 96.539 
(5) Equity ratio 3,764 39.240 18.851 -88.541 95.840 
(6) Industry diversification 3,764 4.190 1.651 2 10 
(7) International diversification 3,764 0.003 0.024 0.000 1.368 
(8) Company beta 3,764 0.998 0.370 -3.075 5.989 
(9) Num. recorded shareholders 3,764 63.812 32.964 0 245 
(10) Num. recorded affiliates 3,764 311.912 312.974 0 1,463 
(11) Companies in group 3,764 312.679 324.893 0 1,779 
(12) Num. recorded subsidiaries 3,764 123.110 592.621 0 6,476 
(13) Pre-tax earnings ratio 3,764 0.076 0.093 -1.408 0.532 
(14) After-tax earnings ratio 3,764 0.052 0.078 -1.408 0.434 
(15) Market-to book value 3,764 1.923 17.435 -513.716 76.873 
(16) Total assets 3,764 46,786,616 71,977,069 2,256.728 373,109,737 
(17) Number of employees 3,764 119,372.100 252,438.300 7 2,200,000 
(18) Fixed asset ratio 3,764 0.249 0.145 -0.029 0.888 
(19) Cash ratio 3,764 0.124 0.116 0.001 0.972 
(20) R&D ratio 3,764 0.030 0.045 0.000 1.068 
(21) R&D dummy 3,764 0.766 0.423 0 1 
(22) GDP growth 3,764 7.384 4.412 -14.759 15.007 
(23) GDP total 3,764 6,194.529 5,058.774 23.416 14,749.000 
(24) Consumer price index 3,764 4.192 2.686 -0.850 26.240 
(25) Lending rate 3,764 12.131 12.505 3.543 55.383 
(26) Exchange rate volatility 3,764 0.035 0.027 0.000 0.206 
(27) Inward FDI 3,764 81.804 74.517 -22.184 231.652 
(28) Emerging market type 3,764 4.195 1.060 1 5 
(29) Home country institutional quality (inverse 
measure) 3,764 22.241 5.699 11 42 
(30) Change in home country institutional quality 
(inverse measure) 3,764 1.130 3.200 -6 13 
(31) Host country institutional quality (inverse 
measure) 3,764 42.254 4.963 23 69 
(32) Change in host country institutional quality 
(inverse measure) 3,764 -0.434 3.192 -10 11 
(33) Institutional distance 3,764 5.562 1.896 1.191 18.452 
(34) Change in institutional distance 3,764 2.290 1.437 -13.470 5.967 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Cost of debt is in per cent, FDI CAPEX in million USD, Long term debt ratio and equity ratio are in per 
cent of total assets, Industry diversification is Number of NACE industry codes, International diversification is foreign revenues over total assets, 
Pre-tax earnings ratio is EBT over total assets, After tax earnings ratio is after-tax earnings over total assets, Total assets is in USD, Fixed assets ratio, 
Cash ratio, and R&D ratio are fractions of total assets, the R&D dummy indicates whether a firm discloses R&D expenditure, GDP growth is in per cent, 
GDP in billion USD, Consumer price index and Lending rate are in per cent, Exchange rate volatility is one-year volatility prior to the investment year, 
Inward FDI is net flow of FDI in billion USD in the year before the investment, Emerging market types are the types identified by (Hoskisson, et al., 
2013), Institutional quality is country risk as provided by the EIU field CORS, Institutional distance is a compound of administrative, political, financial, 
and economic distance (Berry et al., 2010).  
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Pairwise correlations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Cost of debt (t+1) 1 0.052 0.734 0.029 -0.193 0.025 -0.0002 0.201 0.226 0.075 0.080 0.021 -0.032 0.0002 -0.031 -0.023 0.013 
(2) FDI capital expenditure 0.052 1 0.074 0.080 -0.071 -0.018 -0.009 0.058 0.095 0.080 0.074 0.012 0.026 0.020 -0.053 0.144 0.049 
(3) Cost of debt (t-1) 0.734 0.074 1 0.071 -0.235 0.045 -0.002 0.236 0.240 0.068 0.075 0.021 -0.069 -0.032 -0.008 -0.003 0.011 
(4) Long term debt ratio 0.029 0.080 0.071 1 -0.645 0.055 -0.013 0.069 -0.185 0.280 0.260 -0.074 -0.428 -0.372 -0.084 0.378 0.114 
(5) Equity ratio -0.193 -0.071 -0.235 -0.645 1 -0.090 0.011 -0.113 0.039 -0.384 -0.364 0.004 0.351 0.319 0.097 -0.351 -0.207 
(6) Industry diversification 0.025 -0.018 0.045 0.055 -0.090 1 0.036 0.075 0.107 0.203 0.188 0.121 -0.020 -0.010 0.008 0.190 0.190 
(7) International diversification -0.0002 -0.009 -0.002 -0.013 0.011 0.036 1 0.019 0.047 0.049 0.019 -0.012 0.063 0.055 0.004 -0.019 -0.022 
(8) Company beta 0.201 0.058 0.236 0.069 -0.113 0.075 0.019 1 0.340 0.040 0.020 -0.080 -0.109 -0.098 0.004 -0.051 -0.145 
(9) Num. recorded shareholders 0.226 0.095 0.240 -0.185 0.039 0.107 0.047 0.340 1 0.082 -0.042 0.082 0.264 0.253 0.0002 0.045 0.003 
(10) Num. recorded affiliates 0.075 0.080 0.068 0.280 -0.384 0.203 0.049 0.040 0.082 1 0.864 -0.114 -0.070 -0.057 0.003 0.624 0.287 
(11) Companies in group 0.080 0.074 0.075 0.260 -0.364 0.188 0.019 0.020 -0.042 0.864 1 -0.071 -0.081 -0.067 0.0003 0.600 0.294 
(12) Num. recorded subsidiaries 0.021 0.012 0.021 -0.074 0.004 0.121 -0.012 -0.080 0.082 -0.114 -0.071 1 0.099 0.073 0.022 0.129 0.693 
(13) Pre-tax earnings ratio -0.032 0.026 -0.069 -0.428 0.351 -0.020 0.063 -0.109 0.264 -0.070 -0.081 0.099 1 0.964 0.058 -0.077 -0.004 
(14) After-tax earnings ratio 0.0002 0.020 -0.032 -0.372 0.319 -0.010 0.055 -0.098 0.253 -0.057 -0.067 0.073 0.964 1 0.047 -0.063 -0.003 
(15) Market-to book value -0.031 -0.053 -0.008 -0.084 0.097 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.0002 0.003 0.0003 0.022 0.058 0.047 1 -0.011 0.010 
(16) Total assets -0.023 0.144 -0.003 0.378 -0.351 0.190 -0.019 -0.051 0.045 0.624 0.600 0.129 -0.077 -0.063 -0.011 1 0.519 
(17) Number of employees 0.013 0.049 0.011 0.114 -0.207 0.190 -0.022 -0.145 0.003 0.287 0.294 0.693 -0.004 -0.003 0.010 0.519 1 
(18) Fixed asset ratio 0.074 0.160 0.068 0.145 -0.030 -0.051 -0.010 0.00004 0.001 -0.126 -0.151 0.264 0.014 0.004 -0.009 -0.083 0.153 
(19) Cash ratio -0.191 -0.070 -0.208 -0.423 0.495 -0.066 0.061 0.024 0.105 -0.244 -0.212 -0.065 0.231 0.195 0.062 -0.178 -0.165 
(20) R&D ratio -0.090 -0.087 -0.114 -0.238 0.234 -0.019 -0.019 0.089 0.055 -0.121 -0.122 -0.098 -0.104 -0.137 0.039 -0.098 -0.115 
(21) R&D dummy -0.064 0.012 -0.080 -0.002 0.090 0.070 -0.016 0.154 0.031 0.033 0.053 -0.237 -0.041 -0.035 -0.031 0.026 -0.243 
(22) GDP growth 0.037 -0.037 -0.049 -0.173 0.106 -0.105 -0.011 0.065 0.022 -0.117 -0.130 0.030 0.028 0.012 0.004 -0.154 -0.032 
(23) GDP total -0.193 -0.039 -0.145 -0.043 0.100 0.040 -0.033 0.060 -0.002 -0.176 -0.189 0.026 -0.034 -0.038 -0.014 -0.126 -0.058 
(24) Consumer price index 0.138 0.035 0.104 -0.009 -0.060 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.017 -0.035 0.092 0.107 -0.026 0.036 0.044 0.001 0.080 0.028 
(25) Lending rate 0.006 0.120 0.018 0.003 -0.016 -0.130 -0.002 -0.001 0.094 -0.003 -0.002 0.020 0.047 0.047 -0.023 0.016 -0.002 
(26) Exchange rate volatility -0.047 0.105 0.011 0.044 -0.016 -0.180 0.0005 -0.085 -0.050 0.018 0.016 -0.042 0.005 0.001 0.013 0.025 -0.025 
(27) Inward FDI -0.185 -0.038 -0.167 -0.068 0.103 0.051 -0.030 0.073 0.028 -0.196 -0.211 0.020 -0.028 -0.025 -0.022 -0.140 -0.071 
(28) Emerging market type -0.097 0.017 -0.066 -0.085 0.108 -0.167 -0.028 0.080 0.071 -0.189 -0.192 0.058 0.028 0.014 -0.007 -0.166 -0.049 
(29) HC inst. quality (inverse) -0.390 0.044 -0.343 0.114 0.021 0.061 0.037 -0.109 -0.021 -0.091 -0.103 -0.051 -0.102 -0.080 -0.050 -0.037 -0.076 
(30) ∆HC inst. quality (inverse) -0.073 0.025 -0.099 -0.023 0.029 0.136 0.009 0.077 0.119 -0.059 -0.061 0.008 -0.009 0.014 -0.057 -0.049 -0.012 
(31) HSTC instit. quality (inverse) 0.071 -0.039 0.013 -0.059 0.019 0.007 0.024 -0.025 -0.051 -0.002 -0.007 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.004 -0.033 0.008 
(32) ∆ HSTC inst quality (inverse) 0.035 -0.033 -0.013 0.004 -0.015 0.069 0.040 0.028 -0.055 0.010 0.014 -0.024 -0.097 -0.078 -0.045 -0.034 -0.019 
(33) Institutional distance -0.026 -0.022 -0.029 -0.179 0.205 -0.066 -0.002 0.186 0.221 -0.323 -0.316 0.109 0.092 0.075 0.001 -0.218 -0.086 
(34) Change in institutional distance -0.149 -0.025 -0.132 -0.112 0.160 -0.052 -0.025 0.158 0.128 -0.275 -0.284 0.105 0.031 0.017 -0.003 -0.159 -0.048 
Table 2: Part one of pairwise correlations (abbreviations: HC = home country, HSTC = host country) 
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Pairwise correlations (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34 
(1) Cost of debt (t+1) 0.074 -0.191 -0.090 -0.064 0.037 -0.193 0.138 0.006 -0.047 -0.185 -0.097 -0.390 -0.073 0.071 0.035 -0.026 -0.149 
(2) FDI capital expenditure 0.160 -0.070 -0.087 0.012 -0.037 -0.039 0.035 0.120 0.105 -0.038 0.017 0.044 0.025 -0.039 -0.033 -0.022 -0.025 
(3) Cost of debt (t-1) 0.068 -0.208 -0.114 -0.080 -0.049 -0.145 0.104 0.018 0.011 -0.167 -0.066 -0.343 -0.099 0.013 -0.013 -0.029 -0.132 
(4) Long term debt ratio 0.145 -0.423 -0.238 -0.002 -0.173 -0.043 -0.009 0.003 0.044 -0.068 -0.085 0.114 -0.023 -0.059 0.004 -0.179 -0.112 
(5) Equity ratio -0.030 0.495 0.234 0.090 0.106 0.100 -0.060 -0.016 -0.016 0.103 0.108 0.021 0.029 0.019 -0.015 0.205 0.160 
(6) Industry diversification -0.051 -0.066 -0.019 0.070 -0.105 0.040 -0.0002 -0.130 -0.180 0.051 -0.167 0.061 0.136 0.007 0.069 -0.066 -0.052 
(7) International diversification -0.010 0.061 -0.019 -0.016 -0.011 -0.033 -0.002 -0.002 0.0005 -0.030 -0.028 0.037 0.009 0.024 0.040 -0.002 -0.025 
(8) Company beta 0.00004 0.024 0.089 0.154 0.065 0.060 -0.017 -0.001 -0.085 0.073 0.080 -0.109 0.077 -0.025 0.028 0.186 0.158 
(9) Num. recorded shareholders 0.001 0.105 0.055 0.031 0.022 -0.002 -0.035 0.094 -0.050 0.028 0.071 -0.021 0.119 -0.051 -0.055 0.221 0.128 
(10) Num. recorded affiliates -0.126 -0.244 -0.121 0.033 -0.117 -0.176 0.092 -0.003 0.018 -0.196 -0.189 -0.091 -0.059 -0.002 0.010 -0.323 -0.275 
(11) Companies in group -0.151 -0.212 -0.122 0.053 -0.130 -0.189 0.107 -0.002 0.016 -0.211 -0.192 -0.103 -0.061 -0.007 0.014 -0.316 -0.284 
(12) Num. recorded subsidiaries 0.264 -0.065 -0.098 -0.237 0.030 0.026 -0.026 0.020 -0.042 0.020 0.058 -0.051 0.008 0.010 -0.024 0.109 0.105 
(13) Pre-tax earnings ratio 0.014 0.231 -0.104 -0.041 0.028 -0.034 0.036 0.047 0.005 -0.028 0.028 -0.102 -0.009 0.005 -0.097 0.092 0.031 
(14) After-tax earnings ratio 0.004 0.195 -0.137 -0.035 0.012 -0.038 0.044 0.047 0.001 -0.025 0.014 -0.080 0.014 0.006 -0.078 0.075 0.017 
(15) Market-to book value -0.009 0.062 0.039 -0.031 0.004 -0.014 0.001 -0.023 0.013 -0.022 -0.007 -0.050 -0.057 0.004 -0.045 0.001 -0.003 
(16) Total assets -0.083 -0.178 -0.098 0.026 -0.154 -0.126 0.080 0.016 0.025 -0.140 -0.166 -0.037 -0.049 -0.033 -0.034 -0.218 -0.159 
(17) Number of employees 0.153 -0.165 -0.115 -0.243 -0.032 -0.058 0.028 -0.002 -0.025 -0.071 -0.049 -0.076 -0.012 0.008 -0.019 -0.086 -0.048 
(18) Fixed asset ratio 1 -0.349 -0.265 -0.034 0.033 0.009 -0.034 -0.014 0.041 0.001 0.044 0.068 -0.032 -0.003 -0.004 0.061 0.038 
(19) Cash ratio -0.349 1 0.427 0.047 0.087 0.054 -0.045 0.020 -0.045 0.081 0.088 -0.002 0.065 0.018 0.007 0.184 0.132 
(20) R&D ratio -0.265 0.427 1 0.368 0.067 0.046 -0.044 -0.007 -0.040 0.047 0.043 -0.083 -0.026 0.001 -0.030 0.119 0.062 
(21) R&D dummy -0.034 0.047 0.368 1 0.005 0.014 -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 0.014 -0.022 -0.008 -0.024 -0.009 -0.003 0.018 0.020 
(22) GDP growth 0.033 0.087 0.067 0.005 1 0.642 -0.180 -0.405 -0.182 0.577 0.670 -0.112 -0.028 0.149 0.118 0.211 0.492 
(23) GDP total 0.009 0.054 0.046 0.014 0.642 1 -0.259 -0.418 -0.147 0.914 0.786 0.187 0.123 -0.034 -0.018 0.161 0.602 
(24) Consumer price index -0.034 -0.045 -0.044 -0.006 -0.180 -0.259 1 0.307 0.245 -0.121 -0.227 -0.079 0.080 0.324 -0.071 -0.026 -0.190 
(25) Lending rate -0.014 0.020 -0.007 -0.005 -0.405 -0.418 0.307 1 0.457 -0.310 -0.166 0.061 0.064 0.090 -0.109 0.093 -0.284 
(26) Exchange rate volatility 0.041 -0.045 -0.040 -0.010 -0.182 -0.147 0.245 0.457 1 -0.152 0.047 -0.026 -0.119 -0.131 -0.263 0.071 -0.015 
(27) Inward FDI 0.001 0.081 0.047 0.014 0.577 0.914 -0.121 -0.310 -0.152 1 0.717 0.284 0.273 0.023 0.075 0.141 0.539 
(28) Emerging market type 0.044 0.088 0.043 -0.022 0.670 0.786 -0.227 -0.166 0.047 0.717 1 0.063 0.035 -0.159 -0.012 0.248 0.606 
(29) HC inst. quality (inverse) 0.068 -0.002 -0.083 -0.008 -0.112 0.187 -0.079 0.061 -0.026 0.284 0.063 1 0.586 -0.047 0.233 -0.165 0.015 
(30) ∆HC inst. quality (inverse) -0.032 0.065 -0.026 -0.024 -0.028 0.123 0.080 0.064 -0.119 0.273 0.035 0.586 1 0.099 0.251 -0.067 -0.005 
(31) HSTC instit. quality (inverse) -0.003 0.018 0.001 -0.009 0.149 -0.034 0.324 0.090 -0.131 0.023 -0.159 -0.047 0.099 1 0.218 -0.013 -0.148 
(32) ∆ HSTC inst quality (inverse) -0.004 0.007 -0.030 -0.003 0.118 -0.018 -0.071 -0.109 -0.263 0.075 -0.012 0.233 0.251 0.218 1 -0.104 -0.089 
(33) Institutional distance 0.061 0.184 0.119 0.018 0.211 0.161 -0.026 0.093 0.071 0.141 0.248 -0.165 -0.067 -0.013 -0.104 1 0.479 
(34) Change in institutional distance 0.038 0.132 0.062 0.020 0.492 0.602 -0.190 -0.284 -0.015 0.539 0.606 0.015 -0.005 -0.148 -0.089 0.479 1 






DV: marginal cost of debt Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept 2.283*** 1.596** 3.688*** 4.946*** 
 (0.607) (0.523) (0.774) (0.829) 
Cost of debt t-1  0.480*** 0.475*** 0.476*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Long term debt ratio  0.623*** 0.611** 0.588** 
  (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) 
After tax earnings  3.518*** 3.526*** 3.610*** 
  (0.809) (0.807) (0.802) 
Eearnings before tax  -3.572*** -3.570*** -3.648*** 
  (0.702) (0.700) (0.696) 
Market value over book value  -2.671** -2.658** -2.478** 
  (0.915) (0.913) (0.908) 
Firm Size  -0.063** -0.066** -0.063** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Cash Ratio  -0.832*** -0.872*** -0.902*** 
  (0.197) (0.197) (0.196) 
Shareholders  0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutional distance   -0.239** -0.386*** 
   (0.090) (0.095) 
Home country institutional quality (inverted)   -0.024*** -0.032*** 
   (0.006) (0.007) 
Host country institutional quality (inverted)   -0.032** -0.050*** 
   (0.011) (0.012) 
Change in institutional distance    0.028 
    (0.026) 
Change in home country institutional quality (inverted)    0.034*** 
    (0.009) 
Change in host country institutional quality (inverted)    0.063*** 
    (0.017) 
Institutional distance * host country institutional quality 
(inverted) 
  0.005** 0.008*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Institutional distance * change in host country 
institutional quality (inverted) 
   -0.011*** 
    (0.003) 
     
Firm Controls NO YES YES YES 
Industry Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,764 3,764 3,764 3,764 
Log Likelihood -5,995.452 -5,264.778 -5,271.107 -5,269.617 
Table 4: Model 1 is an empty base-line model with only industry and year dummies. Model 2 is a firm level model (insignificant controls are not 
reported). Model 3 adds institutional distance and static institutional quality measures for home and host country. Model 4 is the full dynamic 
model including institutional dynamic and the interaction of distance and host country institutional quality. Models 2-4 include industry, year and 
country-pair fixed effects. Model 4 also uses random effects on the country-pairing level. Additional controls include: log of FDI capital 
expenditure, industry diversification, market-to-book value, log of number of employees, R&D ratio, R&D dummy, international diversification, 
company beta, fixed assets ratio, size of corporate group, number of subsidiaries, cash ratio, host country GDP growth, log of host country GDP, 
consumer price index host country, host country lending rate, host country classification acc. Hoskisson et al (2013), host country incoming FDI, 
and variation in the foreign exchange rate between home and host country.. *, **, and *** indicate significance on the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level 







   
Figure 2: Effect plots of institutional distance and host country institutional distance (CORS inverted) on the marginal 
cost of debt. Top panels display the effect of distance on the cost of debt given strong (left, CORS=25) and weak (right, 
CORS=80) institutions. The bottom panels are the impact of institutional quality given distance, low distance (1) on the 
left and high distance (15) on the right. Dashes in the bottom of the panels show the density of observations. The grey 








Figure 3: Effect plots of institutional distance and changes to host country institutional quality on the marginal cost of 
debt. Top panels display the effect of distance on the cost of debt given expectations of improving (left, Change in 
CORS = -12) and deteriorating (right, CORS =+12) institutional quality. The bottom panels are the impact of 
expectations of changes to the institutional quality in the host country given low distance (1) on the left and given high 
distance (15) on the right. Dashes in the bottom of the panels show the density of observations. The grey area represents 
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